This paper examines the inventories of publicly traded American manufacturing companies between 1981 and 2000. The median of inventory holding periods were reduced from 96 days to 81 days. The average rate of inventory reduction is about 2% per year. The greatest reduction was found for work-in-process inventory which declined by about 6% per year. Finished goods inventories did not decline. Firms with abnormally high inventories have abnormally poor long term stock returns. Firms with slightly lower than average inventories have good stock returns, but firms with the lowest inventories have only ordinary returns.
Introduction
In the 1970s and 1980s Japanese manufacturing companies made substantial market share gains in the U.S. markets in a range of industries, including most notably the car industry.
This stimulated a significant search for the reasons for their success. The "Just-In-Time" (JIT) inventory system was often identified as a key element. There were many calls for a revolution in inventory policies of American firms. It was said that American firms needed to reduce their inventories. It was said that the financial markets would reward firms that cut inventories and punish those that did not do so.
Twenty years later much less is heard about the need for revolutionary changes to inventory policies. Is this due to the fact that the revolution took place and inventories were dramatically reduced? Or did inventory policy remain largely unchanged while other issues became more topical? The only way to tell is to look at the actual inventory holdings of a large number of firms.
In this paper we study the changes in inventories on the part of American manufacturing firms over the period 1981-2000. We examine whether these firms actually reduced their inventories as recommended by the gurus in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Of course there is variation in inventory policy across firms. According to the gurus firms with lean inventories are more valuable than firms with bloated inventories. We examine whether the financial markets value firms in this manner. For both of these questions we examine the data both unconditionally and conditioning on conventional factors. In each case we find the consistent results conditionally and unconditionally. Thus the trends that we document are not driven by factors that are already known in the literature.
We find that inventories were significantly reduced over the period 1981-2000. Inventory days declined on average by about 2% per year. Inventory days declined most rapidly in computer equipment, electronic equipment, and printing and publishing industries.
When we look at the components of the overall inventory interesting differences emerge.
The largest decline is found for work-in-process inventory days which declined about 6% per year. Raw materials declined about 3% per year. Finished goods inventory did not decline.
In some industries finished goods inventory days actually increased -notably in tobacco, leather goods, and medical instruments industries.
A firm that deals efficiently with its suppliers will have low raw materials inventories. A firm that has efficient internal operations will have low work-in-process inventory. From this perspective it appears that firms inventory holdings in raw materials and work-in-process seem to have generally improved significantly over time. However, there is no strong empirical evidence regarding the finished goods inventory. Intuitively, a firm that produces based on forecasting may have higher finished goods inventory in order to have a higher service level (based on the goods availability). But the firm may have its finished goods inventory reduced with better forecasting through better supply chain coordination such as vendor managed inventory. Neither of these contradictory predictions can be shown to have a dominant effect.
When considering stock market valuation it is important to distinguish valuation differences at a moment in time (cross-section) from valuation differences that only emerge as time progresses (time series). In the cross-section there is no evidence that the market places a higher value on firms with lower inventories. However, over time interesting differences do in fact emerge.
A firm with a high Tobin's q (or a high market-to-book ratio) is a firm that the market is valuing particularly highly relative to the accounting measure of value. If lean inventories are highly valued then firms with lean inventories will have particularly high Tobin's q. We find no evidence of any such relationship in the data.
Suppose that valuation differences only emerge gradually. An investor who holds a portfolio of lean inventory firms will accumulate more wealth. An investor who ignores inventories or who holds the shares of firms with bloated inventories will accumulate less wealth.
In order to test this idea we form portfolios based on each firm's abnormal inventory holdings relative to their industry peers. The portfolios are rebalanced annually to reflect changes in corporate inventory positions. The long term value of these portfolios is then compared to the values found in a large number of randomly formed portfolios. If inventory is irrelevant no statistically significant differences should be observed.
We do find that significant valuation differences emerge over time. Firms with abnormally high inventories have abnormally poor stock returns. Firms with abnormally low inventories have ordinary stock returns. Firms with slightly lower than average inventories perform best over time. They outperform average firms by about 4.5% per year on average. Of course, many things other than inventory affect stock returns. Accordingly it is important to study whether the portfolio effects that we identify are simply proxying for some factor that is already known in the empirical literature on asset pricing. In order to address this concern we use the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. This is by far the most popular empirical model of stock returns in recent years. 2 We find that the abnormal inventory effect is not accounted for by the standard model from the empirical finance literature.
There are a few previous studies that are related to our work. Balakrishnan, Linsmeier and Venkatachalam (1996) studied the accounting performance of 46 firms that adopted JIT over the period [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] . Compared to a matched sample of non-adopters, on average there is no effect on the reported return on assets -if anything it declines slightly. The authors are particularly cautious about their results due to the small sample size.
Huson and Nanda (1995) reach a different conclusion. They studied a sample of 55 firms that adopted JIT. They report that the JIT firms do increase the inventory turnover subsequent to adoption, and that they have an increase in earnings per share. Oddly enough, the JIT firms also report a direct increase in unit costs while nonadopters were cutting their unit costs.
Sakakibara, Flynn, Schroeder and Morris (1997) carried out a questionnaire study of 41 plants in the transportation components, electronics and machinery industries. In their surveys they found mixed evidence about how JIT practices and manufacturing performance are related. It is suggested that the effect of JIT comes from its effect on manufacturing strategy and quality management. They do not consider how these practices relate to financial performance.
Surveys of managers necessarily produce a relatively limited sample of firms. Caution is needed since it may be unclear how well the results from fewer than a hundred firms generalize to the thousands of publicly traded firms. However, surveys also have benefits.
Those conducting surveys are not limited in the kinds of questions that can be asked.
It is also possible to study the problem at the industry level rather than the firm level.
the idea of firms having zero inventory. Proponents of pragmatic JIT support reduced inventory, but do not take the idea to an extreme. The valuation evidence is quite suggestive of pragmatic JIT. 2 We have also tried adding the effect of stock market momentum to the model. It makes no important difference to our conclusions, so we do not report those results separately.
code industries in the manufacturing sector of the U.S. economy. Overall inventories declined.
They suggest a need for subsequent research of a different character: "A firm-level analysis may yield insights into the true causes of changes in inventory ratios." "Further, it would be valuable to explore the linkages between inventory performance and financial performance using firm level data." This is very much in the spirit of the current paper.
Hendricks and Singhal (2001) investigated the stock market reaction to the public announcement by a firm that they are experiencing supply chain glitches that are causing production or shipping delays. These commonly result from inventory problems. Based on a sample of 861 announcements, they found that the supply chain glitches significantly decrease the shareholder value. This shows that when problems in normal inventory control are large enough to be "material" and so require announcement, the market cares. The paper does not show whether "normal", but inefficient inventory control practices are deemed important. Hendricks and Singhal (2001) method also does not provide information about the trends in inventory holdings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the key questions to be examined. Section 3 describes inventory measures and the data. Section 4 examines whether inventory actually declined. Section 5 studies the financial impact of inventories. Section 6 provides our conclusions.
Key Questions
There are two basic questions that we set out to answer. First, did inventories actually decline? Second, are the abnormal inventories of some firms related to abnormal financial returns after controlling for the established factors that are usually used to account for stock returns? In each case there are a range of related issues that arise as we study alternative control factors, groupings of the data, and functional form specifications.
Both of our questions were stimulated by the early 1980s literature on Just-In-Time practice. A particularly striking overview was provided by Zipkin (1991) . He suggests that Just-In-Time can be approached from two perspectives: pragmatic JIT and romantic JIT.
Pragmatic JIT promotes inventory reduction, but not zero inventory; it focuses instead on the concrete details of the production process. Romantic JIT calls for a dramatic action and believes in zero inventory. According to Zipkin (1991) , "Schonberger and others repeatedly describe inventory as wasteful, excessive, indeed 'inherently evil.' The aim should be not just to reduce it but to stamp it out." For advocacy examples see Schonberger (1982) and Hall (1983) . Zipkin (1991) also argues that stock market valuations might be affected by inventory reductions.
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A subsidiary question is suggested by Schonberger (1982) . He argues that much of the interest in inventory reductions by American managers focused on their interactions with suppliers. If his claim provides a good characterization of what was really taking place, then we should observe the largest declines on raw materials and finished goods inventories.
The second basic issue is whether low inventories are actually desirable. If inventory reductions are a good thing, then investors should pay more for the firms that reduce inventory.
Is this what we see?
In order to answer this question we need a measure of stock market valuation. Standard measures of valuation include the market-to-book ratio and Tobin's q. They both record the ratio of the amount that the market is willing to pay to own the firm, relative to its book value. They are measures of valuation at a point in time. If investors are willing to pay more for low inventory firms, then inventory will be negatively associated with the market-to-book ratio or Tobin's q.
It is also possible to consider longer term valuation effects. To do this we create portfolios as a function of the inventory levels, and then study how these portfolios perform over time relative to other portfolios. If abnormally low inventories are good, then we would expect to see such firms having high stock returns. It is, of course, necessary to control for the standard asset pricing factors, see Fama and French (1993) .
Inventories are likely to be influenced by macroeconomic conditions. For this reason we consider the effect of using a number of standard macroeconomic factors. Specifically we 3 "The turmoil in the financial markets over the past decade has certainly contributed to the appeal of the more radical versions of JIT. Obviously, any company concerned about the price of its shares would have a strong incentive to reduce inventories, and even more to project inventory reductions in the future. Someone planning a takeover or an LBO would also find such a concept attractive. With working capital freed up, or rather with the promise of lower working-capital requirements, more debt securities can be issued to finance the transaction. And such reductions appear even more tempting when they come easily and without new capital investment." Zipkin (1991) .
consider the effects of: the interest rate (R f ), growth in gross domestic product (GGDP), inflation rate (Infl), and the optimism expressed by purchasing managers (PMI). For our purposes the macro factors are intended as controls. Nonetheless it is worth asking what kinds of effects we expect them to have.
When the interest rate rises, inventories are more expensive relative to holding bonds.
Inventories should drop.
The effect of a booming economy depends on whether it was anticipated or not. When the economy is expanding more rapidly than anticipated (high GDP growth) firms may have trouble keeping up with demand. Lower inventories should be seen. This should particularly affect finished goods. Conversely, when the economy is growing less rapidly than anticipated inventories might tend to build up. These predictions depend on what the firm had been expecting. A booming economy might be booming less than had been anticipated. In that case the prediction is reversed. Accordingly the business cycle predictions are theoretically ambiguous. It is an empirical question whether there is a systematic relationship.
The expected effect of inflation has both a direct cost effect and an indirect effect that operates through the effect of inflation on interest rates. 4 High inflation makes it desirable to buy inputs early -before their prices inflate still further. Thus raw materials inventories should rise. High inflation is also associated with high interest rates. This tends to make it expensive to hold inventories. The effect on overall inventories is ambiguous for this reason.
The purchasing managers index measures optimism about the state of the economy.
When managers are feeling optimistic presumably they will prepare for extra sales and inventories should increase. The relative impact on raw materials, work-in-process and finished goods is an empirical question. Inventory days (ID) measures how many days on average it takes for the inventory to turn over. In year t, let firm i's inventory be I it and let COGS it denote cost of goods sold.
Then inventory days of firm i in year t is
A second popular measure is the inventory-to-sales ratio. If we use sales to replace COGS in the above ratio then we have the inventory-to-sales ratio which we denote as IS. The third measure that we studied is the inventory-to-assets ratio which is denoted as IA. Let TA it denote total assets of firm i in year t. The inventory-to-assets ratio is
This measurement examines the fraction of a firm's assets that are tied up in inventory. Asset ratios are particularly useful for making comparisons across years. This ratio automatically normalizes for firm size. We systematically studied IS, IA, and ID. Generally they provide confirmation of the same results. In order to save space we focus primarily on ID in the tables.
For each of the above inventory measure we can replace overall inventory with raw materials, work-in-process or finished goods. The interpretations change in the obvious manner.
Different industries have different inventory needs. There are, of course, many possible ways to control for industry effects. We have tried a range of alternative methods but found little differences in the conclusions to be drawn. Accordingly we settled on a particularly simple method. We take the the normalized deviation from the industry norm as a measure of whether a particular firm has lean or bloated inventory. To be specific, let AbI it denote abnormal inventory of firm i in year t,
AbI it = ID it − mean inventory days of firm i's 3-digit SIC industry in year t standard deviation of inventory days of firm i's 3-digit SIC industry in year t .
An attractive feature of AbI is that it is units free. The interpretation of AbI is quite simple.
If AbI it > 0 then in year t firm i is holding inventory longer than do other firms in the same industry. Firms with AbI it < 0 hold their inventory for a shorter period of time than do their industry peers. We use data of U.S. firms whose COMPUSTAT incorporation codes are zero. We only include firms with SIC (standard industrial classification) codes from 2000 to 3999 inclusive, 5 Many firms actually span multiple industry segments, but only report firm-level data. We use the firms' primary SIC codes to identify the industries they belong to. So AbI is an approximation of a firm's deviation from the industry mean. Based on the COMPUSTAT Business Segment data, we repeated the same portfolio analysis with all multi-segment firms removed (about half of the data is dropped). The results are consistent with those reported in Section 5. we use CRSP share codes 10 and 11 (i.e., ordinary common shares) provided that they are listed as exchanges codes 1, 2 and 3 (i.e., NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ respectively).
We take the COMPUSTAT identifier GVKEY as our empirical definition of a firm. A handful of stocks are matched to more than one GVKEY. Removing or keeping such duplications has almost no effect on the result.
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COMPUSTAT has several missing value codes. We replace the code "insignificant figure" with zero, while all other codes are replaced by missing values. Since companies may restate data for accounting changes, we use the restated data when available. Data items that may be restated are: assets, sales and cost of goods sold.
When applying a log transformation we replace zero values with 0.001, in order to deal with the fact that the log of zero is not defined. If we replace zero with too small a number, then the log becomes a big negative number -an outlier will be created. We found that 0.001 is the smallest positive data that COMPUSTAT report for inventory, so we use it to replace the zero values. We experimented using slightly smaller values, and found that the conclusions are not affected.
Outlier observations can cause problems, particularly when taking ratios. Accordingly we follow the common procedure of winsorizing the data. For inventory, costs of goods sold, sales and assets, we replace the top 1% of the data by the highest value that is not removed.
It is important to down-weight the extreme tails, but exactly where that cut-off is defined does not make much difference. We experimented with slightly lower and slightly higher 7 To be specific there are 37 PERMNO (the CRSP identifier) matched to more than one GVKEY. In the reported results we resolved the duplications based on the following rules. We remove 26 GVKEY companies who report pre-FASB data. (FASB is the Financial Accounting Standards Board. For its history see http://www.fasb.org/facts/.) We remove nine GVKEY companies whose existence periods overlaps with the existence periods of their duplicates. We remove two GVKEY companies whose data do not agree with their duplicates, and whose existence periods are shorter than their duplicates. The potential concern is that accounting rules give the accountants some discretion.
What is worse sometimes accountants are not honest altogether. Some accountants might be trying to help their clients 'look good.' In the early 1980s looking good generally meant having a low inventory due to the popularity of JIT. In the late 1990s it was quite different.
Consider the famous accounting scandals associated with Arthur Andersen and its clients.
Some firms may have been concerned about appearing over-levered. Inventory typically serves as collateral for debt. From this perspective having a higher inventory might help the firm look good to investors who were worried about being repaid. To the extent that this might have affected the accounting in the late 1990s it would cause firms to exaggerate the size of their inventory.
Our best guess is that the bias in accounting is not all that large. But there is no easy way to measure its impact. To the extent that the accounting bias matters it will cause us to underestimate the rate at which inventory declines.
For the analysis of inventory decline over the full period there are more than 61,000 firm-years for which we have information on total inventories. More than 3/4 of our sample firms provide a breakdown into raw materials, work-in-process, and finished goods inventory.
For the analysis of financial impact of inventories, over 41,000 firm-years of information are available over the 20-year period.
The macroeconomic control factors that we include are conventional. • GGDP (Growth in Gross Domestic Product) is a macroeconomic growth rate. Let GDP be the real gross domestic product in 1996 dollors as reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis at the U.S. Department of Commerce. Then GGDP t = ln(GDP t )− ln(GDP t−1 ).
• Infl is the inflation rate. Let PPI be the "Producer Price Index: All Commodities" as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics at the U.S. Department of Labor. Then Infl t = ln(PPI t ) − ln(PPI t−1 ).
• PMI (Purchasing Managers Index) is a survey measure of the optimism of corporate purchasing managers. A PMI reading above/below 50 percent indicates that in the opinion of the purchasing managers who were surveyed, the economy is generally expanding/declining. This information is from the Institute for Supply Management. It is worth noting that the decline is not caused by shift of inventories from public firms to private firms. We compared the inventory and assets positions of the entire U.S. economy as reported in the U.S. Flow of Funds Accounts 9 to the positions of the firms in COMPUSTAT.
There is no evidence that such a shift accounts for our results. In fact, a greater fraction of the economy-wide U.S. inventory holdings was in public firms' hands by the end of the period than at the start. In 1981, the ratio of publicly traded firms' inventory to the total Flow of Funds inventory was 78.4%. By the year 2000, the ratio became 93.2%. The correlation between the public firm numbers and Flow of Funds numbers are very high. For inventory levels the correlation is 0.995. For change in inventory the correlation is 0.742. The difference is due to the increasing number of publicly traded firms over the period.
The magnitudes of the inventory decline differs across the stages in the inventory cycle. 
Controlling For Other Factors
The descriptive evidence is striking but it does not control for firm heterogeneity, macroeconomic conditions, or changes in industry composition. To address these concerns requires a statistical model.
Our data takes the form of a panel with a great many firms and a much smaller number of years. With panel data there are many models that permit various types of time trends. The models that we consider differ in how much similarity is assumed among firms and among industries. We report results from estimating the following models: I. a random effects model, II. a mixed effects model, III. a fixed effects model. 10 For the reported estimates we 9 See http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/. 10 We also estimated individual firm regressions. But this results in a vast number of parameters and given that many firms have only a few years of data the parameter estimates are not as reliable. They do not alter the main conclusions, but they add a lot of noise. Accordingly we prefer to impose more structure -as in the reported models. We have considered a variety of alternative models which permit heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the errors. Since these alternative specifications do not change our inferences we do not report the results separately.
are explaining inventory days (ID). These models have also been estimated for the inventoryto-sales ratio and the inventory-to-assets ratio. Since the inferences are essentially the same, they are not reported.
Model I is a random effects model given by
where u i and v i are random intercept and slope with zero means, and ε it has zero mean conditional on u i and v i . In order to estimate this model using maximum likelihood method, we further assume that u i and v i are jointly normally distributed and ε it is normally distributed.
Let k index the macro factors with the coefficients denoted m k and the macro factors F k , where F k ∈ {R f , GGDP, Infl, PMI}. Model II is mixed effects model given by
where the same assumptions about the random effects and the errors are made as model I.
In order to ensure that the macroeconomic factors are predetermined, one year lag is used for the macroeconomic factors.
Model III is a fixed effects model given by
where u i is the firm fixed effect contrasting to model I and II, and ε it has zero mean conditional on u i . We use Huber-White robust standard errors in this model. In our judgement all of these considerations are pertinent. Reasonable people can disagree on how heavily to weigh each consideration. As a result we report models I-III and we focus on results that are consistent across model specifications.
In Table 2 we see that all of the models give very similar parameter estimates for the key parameters of interest (i.e. intercept and time trend). The macro control factors also generally have similar effects across specifications. This suggests that the effects that interest us are not very sensitive to the choice among these three types of models.
In model I, the fitted inventory days can be expressed as ID t = e a+b(t−1981) . Thus, the fitted inventory days in 1981 is e a , and the yearly percentage change of the fitted inventory days is (ID t+1 − ID t )/ID t = 100(e b − 1)% ≈ 100 b%. The values of the time trends reported in Table 2 can be interpreted as the yearly percentage change of inventory days.
Model I estimates that the total inventory days in 1981 was e 4.24 ≈ 70 days and declined about 2% per year; raw material was e 3.24 ≈ 26 days in 1981 and declined about 3% per year; work-in-process was e 2.18 ≈ 9 days in 1981 and declined about 6% per year; finished goods was e 2.55 ≈ 13 days in 1981 and has no significant decline or increase.
In Table 2 consider the results for total inventory days, raw material and work-in-process.
We see that in all models the coefficient on time is negative and statistically significant. It is the most negative for work-in-process. Total inventories declined under all models and work-in-process declined most significantly. This is a very robust result.
Raw materials, work-in-process, and finished goods inventories play quite different roles in a firm's operations. Raw materials relate to the firm's interactions with suppliers. Work-in-process reflects the efficiency of the firm's own operations. Finished goods relate to the firm's interactions with customers.
There is very strong evidence that the manufacturing firms we study improved their interactions with suppliers, and their own internal operations. However there is no corresponding drop in finished goods inventory. Indeed, if one prefers the firm fixed effects model (model III), there is even some evidence that finished goods may have increased.
It is worth noting that there is a strong evidence that product variety has increased dramatically, see Next, we decompose the effects into 25 individual industries. We use mostly 2-digit industries. For some industries there are a sufficient number of firms to permit further subdivision into 3-digit SIC codes. There are also seemingly problematic cases that we adjusted.
12 Figure 2 shows the median inventory days over the years for each industry. to just one or two industries. Rather, it is a pervasive phenomenon observed in many industries. There are 8 out of 25 industries whose decline in total inventory days is significant at conventional significance levels, under any model specification. No industry exhibits an increasing inventory trend that is robust across model specifications.
Focusing on the coefficients from model I for illustration, we find the most rapid decline was in computer equipment (5% per year), printing and publishing (5%), and electronic equipment (3%). These are significant under all specifications. Five industries have 1-2% decline per year that are significant across all estimated models. These industries are furniture and fixtures, machinery, motor vehicles, aircraft, and non-medical instruments industries.
In Table 3 we have separately reported the finished goods results, but not the raw materials and work-in-process. We do this because the finished goods pattern differs from the total inventory results, while raw materials and work-in-process do not differ significantly from the total.
In Table 3 For work-in-process, there are 15 industries that exhibit a declining trend which is robust across model specifications. The most rapid decline is found in computer equipment (13% per year), leather (12%), and apparel and footwear (10%) industries. For raw material, there are 12 industries exhibit robust decline. The three fastest are leather (10%), printing and publishing (8%), and computer equipment (7%).
As in any estimation there are occasional anomalies observed. The drug industry is the only industry that has a serious discrepancy between median measure and panel data model.
The drug industry has almost no change in its total inventory days under models I-III. But the median inventory days declined dramatically. This is because there was a great number of new firms that entered. There were only 74 firms in 1981, and almost 400 firms in later 90s. There were 540 new firms entering the industry from 1982-2000, but 304 of them have zero inventory in the entering year. These firms typically entered with low or zero inventories which brought down the median, but it had little effect on the time trend in the panel data model. Many of these firms were essentially publicly traded research projects. Table 3 also serves to reinforce the fact that finished goods inventory performed quite differently from raw materials and work-in-process. A simple way to describe the evidence is to say that the manufacturing firms have reduced the inefficiencies in their interactions with their suppliers and in their own internal operations. At the same time they have become more customer focused in that they have more finished goods ready for delivery, or they have to keep more finished goods due to increased product variety that implies the increased demand variability. A critical argument on behalf of inventory reduction is the claim that it will improve the financial position of firms. If this claim is true, then the market should value firms that have already reduced their inventories more highly than they value firms that have not reduced their inventories. Is this argument empirically valid? A common way to answer this type of question is to ask whether the factor of interest is associated with the market-to-book ratio or Tobin's q which is defined as: (the market value of equity + book value of debt) / book value of total assets. Both lead us to the same inferences about the market valuation of inventory. This is tested with a simple regression,
13 Ideally we would have liked to be able to identify the deeper factors that permitted these trends to arise. Many possible factors could be at work such as increased computerization, better delivery systems due to trucking deregulation and the rise of FedEx, improved scheduling software, an increase in the number of products produced by each firm, better understanding of potential drawbacks to holding inventory, etc. There are many such plausible factors. We have been unable to find reasonable empirical measures of these factors. Accordingly we are not in a position to judge the relative importance of each of these plausible factors.
The result from (4) is Tobin's q = 2.156 − 0.0558 AbI. The t-statistics are 63.73 on the intercept and −1.61 (i.e., insignificant) on the slope. Adding the macroeconomic factors as regressors has almost no effect on the slope. Use of more complex functional form specifications and lagged specifications leads to the same basic conclusion. In this type of test there is no evidence of a significant impact of inventories on Tobin's q. Replacing Tobin's q by the market-to-book ratio (as defined in Fama and French (1993)) does not change the conclusion.
Inventories and Longer Term Stock Returns
The cross-sectional analysis raises the possibility that the markets are not concerned about inventories. If that is correct then firms with abnormally large inventories should have just as strong long term stock market performance as do other firms. In order to study this question we follow the popular methodology developed by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) .
The method has become common in finance since Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) is repeated year by year. In each year t we sell all the stocks, and then re-sort the firms according to the AbI in year t − 1. We take the money generated by decile i from year t − 1 and reinvest it equally in the new decile i for year t. We repeat this procedure for each decile over the 20 years. We term the lowest AbI decile as decile 1, and the highest AbI decile is decile 10. If low inventory is good then the lowest AbI decile portfolio will have an abnormally high return. This is the prediction from romantic JIT. On the other hand, if romantic JIT is false, then it is also quite possible to find high returns in some other portfolios.
In order to decide if the returns are abnormal we need to determine the normal range.
Suppose that AbI is really just noise that has nothing at all to do with stock returns. Then by chance it will sometimes happen to look as if it matters. But this will be rare. We mimic this process by using a random number generator to produce random portfolios. Having created a large number of such portfolios we then see whether the observed returns on that AbI portfolios lie in the tails of the distribution.
To be specific, at the beginning of 1981, we randomly select 10% of the stocks, and invest $1 equally in the selected stocks. In each of the following years, we take the money generated from previous years and reinvest it equally in a newly randomly selected portfolio in that year. We do this many times so that in the end we have created 100,000 of these random portfolios. If AbI is really significant then it should generate returns that are in the tails The final results are also reported numerically in Table 4 . In addition to the overall results, we check for robustness to time period by providing results for the 1980s and the 1990s separately. Finally, Table 4 goes beyond Table 3 by showing the effect conditioning on firm size. Figure 3 and Table 4 show that high AbI (decile 9 and 10) is associated with unusually bad stock returns. This is true for the entire period from 1980 to 2000, and also true for each of the decades considered separately. Deciles 9 and 10 have abnormally poor returns, while decile 3 and 4 has abnormally high returns. Using continuously compounded returns, decile 4 has a return of 19.1% per year, which is 4.5% above the median portfolio. Table 4 also reports portfolio results that are conditioned on firm size. The abnormally poor returns are found in decile 10 across all firm sizes, and in decile 9 for medium and large firms. The abnormally high returns are observed in deciles 4 across all firm sizes, and in decile 2, 3 and 5 for some firm size groups.
To summarize, the evidence strongly rejects the idea that firms with the lowest levels of inventory perform best. Instead, consistent with pragmatic JIT, 'low but not too low' inventory seems to have done particularly well. Firms with bloated inventory perform poorly.
Is AbI a Proxy for Risk?
The portfolio analysis shows that high AbI is associated with low stock returns. But, according to standard financial theory, in a stock market equilibrium different stocks will have different average returns depending on how much nondiversifiable risk they expose their shareholders to. Thus AbI really could be serving as a proxy for a known risk factor.
In order to investigate this, we adopt a standard empirical asset pricing framework which is due to Fama and French (1993) . Let i be the portfolio index. We run an expected return regression:
The financial risk factors are: R m (common market factor), R f (risk-free rate), SMB (firm size factor), and HML (market-to-book ratio factor). In principle many things could be included as potential risk factors. Empirically, as shown by Fama and French (1993) this relatively small set of factors perform very reliably. We run regression (5) for each AbI decile portfolio. The coefficients (b, c, d, and e) measure how sensitive a given portfolio returns are to the respective risk factors.
If the standard risk factors explain the returns, then the intercept a should equal zero.
A value of a that differs significantly from zero is an indication of a return that is not explained by the standard factors. For JIT theory it then becomes of interest to see whether the abnormal values of a are found in the lowest decile as expected under romantic JIT. Table 5 (a) shows that abnormally high returns are found from deciles 3 through 7, and abnormally low return is found in decile 10. The role of firm size is a potential source of concern. Accordingly in Table 5 (b) we divide the portfolios in thirds according to firm size.
We then carry out the analysis separately for small firms, medium firms and large firms.
The statistical significance of low, but not extremely low, AbI deciles seems to be somewhat stronger for the large firms. The bad performance of extremely low AbI deciles is found for all sizes of firms.
The results in Table 5 are consistent with the portfolio findings. The fact that similar results are found using such different methods and such different conditioning factors is reassuring. The results seem to be quite robust.
The results show that inventory provides information that is relevant for stock returns.
This information is public, and it is not reflected in the standard model (Fama and Whenever a factor is shown to be associated with high returns, each of these points of view can be proposed. Significant debate has been ongoing in the literature over the relative merits of each interpretation. Fama (1998) provides a helpful overview from an efficient markets perspective.
Transactions cost declined significantly over the past twenty years. But we find that the excess return is both in the 1980s and in the 1990s data. So we are not inclined to favor the first interpretation. The results in Table 5 show that if a risk factor is driving the results, it
is not a type of risk that is reflected in the conventional model. In panel (b) of Table 5 we see that the abnormal returns in decile 4 are found for all size categories of firms. This shows that the effect is not simply a firm size effect. However the effect is numerically largest for the small firm category. Such firms are often deemed to be relatively risky. Thus the idea that inventory is reflecting a risk factor that is otherwise missing seems plausible to us.
There is, of course, no way to prove that it is inventory itself that is the driving force.
Another omitted factor that is suitably correlated with our inventory measure could be the true driving force. For example, our inventory measure (AbI) could be serving as a general proxy for "unexpectedly well run firms." We are only in a position to argue that the evidence is reflecting something that matters. We are not in a position to prove causality.
In an effort to ensure that these results were not being driven by some other omitted factor, we studied other aspects of the corporate balance sheets and income statements.
Despite many tests we were not able to identify any such factors. In order to save space, we do not report these negative results in any detail.
Conclusion
This paper establishes two basic empirical points about the inventory holdings of U.S.
manufacturing firms over the period 1981-2000. First, we show that the broad population of manufacturing firms in the U.S. did significantly reduce their inventories. This reduction was particularly marked for work-in-process inventory. This reduction is not explained by macroeconomic effects, nor by a shift of inventory from public firms towards private firms.
Second, we examined the association between abnormal inventory and the stock market performance. In the cross-section abnormal inventory has no effect on the market-to-book ratio or Tobin's q. Over the longer term inventory does seem to matter. Firms with abnormally high inventory have poor long term stock market performance. Firms with low, but not extremely low inventory have unusually good long term stock market performance.
However firms with the lowest levels of inventory have only ordinary performance. These stock market returns are not accounted for by the conventional financial factors of Fama and French (1993) .
The skeptical idea that nothing of substance changed, apart from the macroeconomic conditions is clearly rejected. However, there is evidence that the macroeconomic conditions affect inventories. Interest rates are negatively related to work-in-process inventory. Inflation is associated with an increase in the holdings of raw materials. Apparently this reflects an effort to buy goods before the prices rise. When managers expect improving economic performance they increase their inventory of finished goods. These macroeconomic factors have sensible impacts. But there is no evidence that they can account for the main long term trend of declining inventory.
In the early 1980s many argued that American manufacturing firms needed to dramatically reduce their inventories. Of course, real firms did not achieve the zero inventory that was advocated by some of the gurus. However quite respectable reductions did take place.
Total inventory declined by about 2% a year on average over the 20 years. Work-in-process has had a remarkable performance with an average annual drop of approximately 6%. Notably immune to the drop was finished goods inventory which was largely unchanged. While this might not have been the kind of inventory revolution envisioned by some in the early 1980s, the improvements that took place are actually quite respectable.
More recently there are calls for the supply chain management to focus on the coordination between suppliers and retailers. Anecdotal evidence of best practices suggests that manufacturing firms can reduce their finished goods inventory through, for example, vendor managed inventory and information sharing. The fact that finished goods inventories did not decline suggests that there may be room for improvement on that front. However, it is likely to take several years before it will be possible to study whether such effects on finished goods inventory for a large number of firms is currently taking place. Intercept and time trend correspond to a and b in equation (1), (2) and (3), respectively. Model I and II are estimated using maximum likelihood method, and the log likelihood is reported. To estimate model III, we create firm dummies and apply OLS with Huber-White robust estimator of standard error (statistical packages usually offer commands to handle fixed-effects regression automatically so that creating dummies is unnecessary). Time trends and the coefficients of macroeconomic factors are reported 100 times larger than their original values. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. t-statistics are reported in brackets. Intercept and time trend correspond to a and b in equation (1), (2) and (3), respectively. Time trends are reported 100 times larger than their original values. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. t-statistics are reported in brackets. There are 7431 firms providing 62218 observations of inventory to assets ratios, and 7295 firms providing 61038 observations of inventory days. Not all firms report their inventory components. As a result, the numbers of firms and observations for the inventory components are slightly less.
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